The moral imagination is the thing that assigns value to our values. If confronted with a complex moral situation which theory would be best to help us make sense of a confusing situation? How are priorities set and decisions made when there seems to be no clear moral path to take (or perhaps far too many to take); how do we choose? I am currently going through many of these questions and to be honest have been floundering for quite some time. I know I want to go graduate school, unfortunately deadlines are coming up at the end of the month and I am unsatisfied with the strength of what I'm sending in. However, I'm also unsatisfied with my school performance. The more I give to one the more I seem to carve out of the other. Yet, these are two very linked "worlds", especially because I would like to one day go into academia for a living. How can I ask a professor to write me a letter of recommendation when I know I am underperforming in their class? How can I in good conscious convince a grad school that I am professor material when I cannot make it as a student? Should I sacrifice the time I work on class assignments for more time to work on my statement of purpose? What classes must be sacrificed in order to complete the work of another? It doesn't end at school either. How can I tell my friends, who have helped me remain sane for four years, that though this is the last year we have together I don't have time to help with their problems? How do I tell the girl who likes me that though I like her as well I don't have time to be a good boyfriend because my future asks for my present? The categorization and prioritizing of all these problems, costs and benefits, are weighed by the moral imagination. How we assign worth to the constant barrage of opportunities that present themselves, especially when these opportunities are neither entirely good nor entirely bad.
Pardales lists some of the ways our brains assign moral laws and constructs in order to deal with the dizzying number of nuances in most real world situations. The prototype works as a sort of moral induction. Based on previous situations in which a moral category was deployed (such as the idea of "fairness" when one is being cheated) we form exemplars that work to inform us on how to use these moral ideas. In other words every instance of a moral dilemma calls for a category, usually a bit of "stretching" is involved in applying it or perhaps an elucidation which leaves us with a changed, perhaps evolved, category to deploy again when we're done.
Sometimes metaphor guides our thinking. How are we to define and use a term like "justice"? One way is through experiences in which we are informed of what justice is compared to metaphorically. For example going to a court room and seeing the word "justice" deployed in a way to sentence a criminal we may begin to see justice as a redress of a grievance, either personal or against the state. If we reflect on the metaphors we use when talking about a situation we can be informed by the underlying connections within our language to gain a better understanding of how we process morally ambiguous situations. When we talk about justice how do we link this idea to other ideas, perhaps justice is closely tied in our mind with judgment, normalization, and punishment or perhaps we see it as equality and compensation in order to restore a "balance".
The third strategy discused by Pardales is the idea of narrative. I found this to be particularly relevent to my study of history. By creating a story, or perhaps a better word would be fable, we can examine the institutions that putatively "created" us-- things like upbringing, family situation, economic status-- and assign them a narrative quality. The quality of narrative allows you to asses your life like you would the plot of a movie. We can guess the kind of decisions we should make based on where we place ourselves in our narrative and how we construct and value the "actors" in our life. Thinking of things as "events" in your life is probably the most common way of using the narrative source of knowledge. We assign value to these events in order to learn from them, to take them as cues on where our story might go or as warnings and portents for a path that could lead to an unsatisfactory ending.
Lastly moral perception is somewhat a kin to empathy. It's the recognition of callousness or kindness in ourselves, or in other words a constant awareness of our ethical situation that serves to inform our actions. The ability to recognize the moral aspects of a situation is moral perception.
How to cultivate this moral imagination then becomes the best way to ensure a correct moral choice through the proper valuation of principles. I've thought about it a lot today and this article has been extremely important to me. Unfortunately I have to read for another class so I probably won't be able to finish the other two before I go to bed, but I will try. I've tried to take a step back and assess my situation. Why should I go to graduate school unprepared? Why should I sacrifice a semester that could be spent studying in a healthy way (an act I enjoy enough to pursue it as a career) for one that is spent spitting out half finished and unsatisfactory work in classes I should be savoring. These classes could teach me how to better deal with my situation (and they have somewhat thanks to the kindness and advice of professors I respect who are willing to talk to me after class) yet I cannot give them the attention they deserve because the situation that they could enlighten me on precludes me from full engagement with them. In a time of moral (and general) uncertainty why should I destroy both my prospects for entering the best graduate school I can attend, ruin one of the last opportunities I have to get the most out of the end of my undergraduate career, and give up my social life in the process? The article made me realize it is a losing equation to live my life this way. For that reason I've decided (after I talk with my advisor some more about it on Friday) that I'm going to work a year before I attend graduate school and assemble the best portfolio I can in the mean time. This will hopefully free up time to give these classes what they deserve of me and what I believe I can deliver. I feel awful about wasting so much time and putting myself through so much misery pursuing a course I might postpone, but I find this decision to be liberatory. I've come to realize that I took the wrong approach in this class when expecting of it something akin to analytic philosophy, but I've also come to appreciate that in the breakdown of analytic thinking (my Deviance and Philosophy of Science classes have both done most of the breaking down) I needed moral thinking. Before what seemed like nonsense to me is the only thing that is beginning to make sense. The question of "what to do" looms extremely large in this crossroads in my life and it was the lack of an ethical approach and an ethically uncultivated state that prevented me from seeing the forest through the trees. I thought I was being mature about making these sacrifices (is this what being an adult is about? I frequently wondered) but I've realized I was actually immature for treating people and things I cared about as in competition in order to rush something that I perhaps was not ready for but felt was expected of me. I realize this is getting long and a bit rambling but it has come as a bit of a revelation for me. I feel so so much better, and I think it is the kind of good feeling that comes from having taken an ethical (in ways I never would have defined it) approach. It is a very healthy feeling happiness.
Thursday, November 13, 2008
Thursday, November 6, 2008
I don’t know if I fully agree with Marquis’ assessment of abortion but I did find it the most interesting. What I found fascinating was the idea that killing is wrong because it deprives an individual of all future enjoyments or experiences. I’m not sure why but this seems like a fairly weak ethical justification, yet also completely correct. It says that the act of killing is not wrong in itself but rather for what it entails, namely death or more specifically the loss of a life lived in the future. Marquis says that this position avoids the sort of rights arguments usually construed as, “it is wrong to kill to kill another person because they are rational, they are biologically a human being, it brutalizes the murderer, ect”. The act of killing, according to Marquis, is not in itself unethical but rather that it brings the consequence of death. But many things bring death as a consequence. Would it be comprehensible to say someone was “murdered” by nature if they die from exposure? Surely exposure also brings death, and it is in the dying of another that an act is made unethical, why then can we not say that nature is unethical, or even more radically that life is unethical because it can be seen as the slow murdering of an individual until their eventual death? Everything you do, by virtue of taking up time, contributes to your eventual death. That does not mean that making soup or typing this blog is unethical, and it certainly does not mean that it is murderous.
Murder is fundamentally an act performed by a person with another person as its target, to say then that ethics in this situation do not concern how a person is defined to me seems disingenuous. If murder can only be performed by people and a murdered victim can only be defined first and foremost as a “murdered person”, "murdered animal" ect it seems absolutely necessary to nail down a definition of what being a person entails before we can rightly say that something has been murdered. This brings us back to the debate that Marquis lays out in the beginning: whether a person is defined through reason, biology, divine sanction or whatever. The debate over abortion (or murder or nearly any ethical question) necessarily entails how the objects in question, whether fetuses, people, animals, the handicapped, ect are defined. The question then becomes which of the myriad ways to define a person is correct?
Murder is fundamentally an act performed by a person with another person as its target, to say then that ethics in this situation do not concern how a person is defined to me seems disingenuous. If murder can only be performed by people and a murdered victim can only be defined first and foremost as a “murdered person”, "murdered animal" ect it seems absolutely necessary to nail down a definition of what being a person entails before we can rightly say that something has been murdered. This brings us back to the debate that Marquis lays out in the beginning: whether a person is defined through reason, biology, divine sanction or whatever. The debate over abortion (or murder or nearly any ethical question) necessarily entails how the objects in question, whether fetuses, people, animals, the handicapped, ect are defined. The question then becomes which of the myriad ways to define a person is correct?
Thursday, October 23, 2008
Utilitarianism
Mill begins by saying that if we are looking for something like a scientific proof for any ethical system we misuse the term "proof", or at least deploy it in an improper setting when we try to apply it to ethics. I found this fascinating because I think I frequently am lost in ethics because it's mode of proving itself is foreign to me and I did not study the theories on their own terms. Because ethics seeks what is good, "whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof," (184). Ethics, then, is an intellectual pursuit, and not an ends, and, "the formula may be accepted or rejected, but it is not a subject of what is commonly understood by proof."(184)
In part II, Mill defends utilitarianism from the historic critiques of similar systems like Epicureanism, and in so doing helps to positively shape what he conceives as the "rule of Happiness". Utilitarianism, he says, is not the Bacchanalian pursuit of pleasure that it is sometimes characterized as, nor is it the cold spreadsheet analysis of pure utility. Instead, utilitarianism seeks happiness by satisfying the noblest human wants for the most amount of people. We might momentarily stray into immediate or beastly pleasure but it is our sense of dignity, the thing that separates us from beasts and ignorant people, that must eventually be satisfied to achieve pleasure. The biggest question I have for Mill is one he brings up himself when he writes, "What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain[?]"(189). He says to answer this we must rely on the testimony of the experienced, but aren't there many choices that we make that don't manifest their full costs, or their full pleasures for that matter, until long after we have made them? When is someone experienced enough to be counted as reliable testimony for the costs and benefits of a decision? We can surely limit the scope of what will be affected by our moral decisions, Mill says on 196 that 999 out of 1000 of our decisions are ones that regard private utility and don't require considering the broad public interests of the decision, but I still think it is a problem that we can't more fully measure the pains and pleasures that will be unleashed by our decision. After all, if the backbone of utilitarianism is picking the option that maximizes pleasure and diminishes it's opposite we first must be able to get the facts of each option.
In part II, Mill defends utilitarianism from the historic critiques of similar systems like Epicureanism, and in so doing helps to positively shape what he conceives as the "rule of Happiness". Utilitarianism, he says, is not the Bacchanalian pursuit of pleasure that it is sometimes characterized as, nor is it the cold spreadsheet analysis of pure utility. Instead, utilitarianism seeks happiness by satisfying the noblest human wants for the most amount of people. We might momentarily stray into immediate or beastly pleasure but it is our sense of dignity, the thing that separates us from beasts and ignorant people, that must eventually be satisfied to achieve pleasure. The biggest question I have for Mill is one he brings up himself when he writes, "What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain[?]"(189). He says to answer this we must rely on the testimony of the experienced, but aren't there many choices that we make that don't manifest their full costs, or their full pleasures for that matter, until long after we have made them? When is someone experienced enough to be counted as reliable testimony for the costs and benefits of a decision? We can surely limit the scope of what will be affected by our moral decisions, Mill says on 196 that 999 out of 1000 of our decisions are ones that regard private utility and don't require considering the broad public interests of the decision, but I still think it is a problem that we can't more fully measure the pains and pleasures that will be unleashed by our decision. After all, if the backbone of utilitarianism is picking the option that maximizes pleasure and diminishes it's opposite we first must be able to get the facts of each option.
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
If we are take non-contradiction seriously than any moral statement should work like the "golden rule." If I say, "criminals should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law" it would be hypocritical of me to ask for a reduced sentence. I would in effect be saying, "this should be applied to everyone else but not me" and that is a contradiction. For certain things it would unreasonable for nearly everyone to be contradictory and therefore we could perhaps find a universal moral code for some things. For example, we might say, "is it ever right to kill yourself?" The person contemplating suicide would have to ask themselves whether it would be right for everyone in the world to kill themselves, if it wouldn't then they would contradicting themselves by saying, "it would be morally acceptable for me to kill myself."
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Hume
Hume begins section 1 with a reiteration to what we read earlier in class. He says that ethics must apply to the sentiments and not to reason alone. However, he also says that reason can guide us and inform us regarding the facts a situation, and that these should be considered when making moral choices. It is not enough simply to say that because a certain is perceived as odious to you it is viceful (or vice versa regarding virtue), this opinion must be informed by expirience. What I found interesting is that in one sentence he says, "It is probable..that this final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, hich nature has made universal in the whole species" (75). This speaks to the distinction we made earlier in class over a Hume conception of "objective" versus a Greek or traditional view of "objective", the former relating to universality and the latter refering to some "out there" principle which can be discovered outside of us as opposed to observed within human nature.
The overriding theme for the rest of the reading is the idea of utility. Utility, for Hume, both helps define our idea of things like justice as well as sets the context for such a term to be meaningful. For Hume their is no overriding principle which guides ethical action in all situations, but rather morality depends largely on social circumstance. He gives the example of a shipwreck victim procurring as much goods as he can for survival at the expense of other victims. This would not be unethical for Hume since justice depends on at least the ability of social sustainability. He talks of how in a society free of want justice loses its meaning but in a society in which the basic needs for all absent justice loses its utility and must be disregarded.
At first I read this conception justice in a positive light. I think it would healthy policy (both in foreign and domestic policy) to assure that basic needs for all people are met- if not to be morally good than to at least ensure that justice, which surely serves people, functions in a healthy way. However, he says that as the relationship of the state enters into the question of morality it is sometimes necessary to suspend the rule of law when justice is no longer a utility to the public. He writes, "Men are necessarilly born in a famil-society, at least; and are trained up by their parents to some ruleofconduct and behavior. But this mustbeadmitted, tha, ifsuchastateofmutual war andviolence was ever real,thesuspension ofalllaws andjustice, from their absolute inutility, is a necessary and infallibalble consequence." The first thing I thought of when I read this was the USPATRIOT act. I had never thought about it but if justice is seen strictly in view of how beneficial it is to society does that mean that there are times when it can be suspended? Shouldn't it be argued that justice is always beneficial to society, even in times of total war, and has intrinsic value, or at least there would never be a situation in which the suspension of justice was more beneficial than its upkeep?
The overriding theme for the rest of the reading is the idea of utility. Utility, for Hume, both helps define our idea of things like justice as well as sets the context for such a term to be meaningful. For Hume their is no overriding principle which guides ethical action in all situations, but rather morality depends largely on social circumstance. He gives the example of a shipwreck victim procurring as much goods as he can for survival at the expense of other victims. This would not be unethical for Hume since justice depends on at least the ability of social sustainability. He talks of how in a society free of want justice loses its meaning but in a society in which the basic needs for all absent justice loses its utility and must be disregarded.
At first I read this conception justice in a positive light. I think it would healthy policy (both in foreign and domestic policy) to assure that basic needs for all people are met- if not to be morally good than to at least ensure that justice, which surely serves people, functions in a healthy way. However, he says that as the relationship of the state enters into the question of morality it is sometimes necessary to suspend the rule of law when justice is no longer a utility to the public. He writes, "Men are necessarilly born in a famil-society, at least; and are trained up by their parents to some ruleofconduct and behavior. But this mustbeadmitted, tha, ifsuchastateofmutual war andviolence was ever real,thesuspension ofalllaws andjustice, from their absolute inutility, is a necessary and infallibalble consequence." The first thing I thought of when I read this was the USPATRIOT act. I had never thought about it but if justice is seen strictly in view of how beneficial it is to society does that mean that there are times when it can be suspended? Shouldn't it be argued that justice is always beneficial to society, even in times of total war, and has intrinsic value, or at least there would never be a situation in which the suspension of justice was more beneficial than its upkeep?
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Natural Virtues and Vices
Hume identifies a distinction between natural and artifical virtues and vices but the two are more closely tied than their titles would suggest. Artificial virtues are virtues that are "made" by society in order to benefit it. An artificial virtue may be something like "political justice" or "politeness" which are agreed upon by everyone to be beneficial but which must appeal to a natural virtue in order to be legitimate. A natural virtue is something like sympathy which does not have to be reasoned (at least according to Hume) and is simply felt. For example a politician may make an overture for the artificial virtue of political justice but it is our natural virtue of sympathy that lends this plea weight.
Here sympathy does not seem to mean the same thing as compassion, which is a sort of limitless forgiveness for circumstance, but rather acts as a sort of universal law based on humanities similiar dispositions. Because we all have relatively universal feelings (pain, pleasure, ect) we can identify in someone qualities that we esteem (or despise) in ourselves or qualities that we wish we had (or are glad that we don't). Sympathy then, "is the source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues." (369). Hume draws finer and finer distinctions throughout the chapter (ex: we are more likely to sympathsize with someone who is relatively closer or better known to us) but the same general principle runs throughout. The question I would pose here is how this accounts for people like sociopaths who perhaps take advantage of people's sympathy without feeling any of their own.
Also, I don't even know where to begin on this quote but it seems from the paragraph following it that it deals with proximity in regards to the level of sympathy felt (ex: more sympathetic to shipwrecked sailors if I can see them then if I simply read about them).
"In all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive from another, to which it is compared, a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in its direct and immediate survey. The direct survey of another's pleasure naturally gives us pleasure, and therefore produces pain when compared with our own. His pain considered in itself, is painful to us, but augments the idea of our own happiness, and gives us pleasure." (emphasis mine).
Hume seems to be saying that through the natural virtue of sympathy we will feel happy when someone around us is happy but this pleasure raises our expectations and will produce more pain in us (and vice versa for someone expiriencing pain in proximity to us- we will eventually derive pleasure). This seems to say that someone emoting near us will produce both pleasure and pain. If this is the case how can we say something is moral in Hume's system? Something is moral, according to Hume, if it illicits a feeling of pleasure in us, but if nearly all things will illicit both pleasure and pain then is anything properly moral in a Humean sense?
Here sympathy does not seem to mean the same thing as compassion, which is a sort of limitless forgiveness for circumstance, but rather acts as a sort of universal law based on humanities similiar dispositions. Because we all have relatively universal feelings (pain, pleasure, ect) we can identify in someone qualities that we esteem (or despise) in ourselves or qualities that we wish we had (or are glad that we don't). Sympathy then, "is the source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues." (369). Hume draws finer and finer distinctions throughout the chapter (ex: we are more likely to sympathsize with someone who is relatively closer or better known to us) but the same general principle runs throughout. The question I would pose here is how this accounts for people like sociopaths who perhaps take advantage of people's sympathy without feeling any of their own.
Also, I don't even know where to begin on this quote but it seems from the paragraph following it that it deals with proximity in regards to the level of sympathy felt (ex: more sympathetic to shipwrecked sailors if I can see them then if I simply read about them).
"In all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive from another, to which it is compared, a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in its direct and immediate survey. The direct survey of another's pleasure naturally gives us pleasure, and therefore produces pain when compared with our own. His pain considered in itself, is painful to us, but augments the idea of our own happiness, and gives us pleasure." (emphasis mine).
Hume seems to be saying that through the natural virtue of sympathy we will feel happy when someone around us is happy but this pleasure raises our expectations and will produce more pain in us (and vice versa for someone expiriencing pain in proximity to us- we will eventually derive pleasure). This seems to say that someone emoting near us will produce both pleasure and pain. If this is the case how can we say something is moral in Hume's system? Something is moral, according to Hume, if it illicits a feeling of pleasure in us, but if nearly all things will illicit both pleasure and pain then is anything properly moral in a Humean sense?
Sunday, September 28, 2008
I'm still a bit confused of what to make of Hume's claim that reason can say nothing regarding ethics. He writes that because reason is only concerned with whether something is true or false it cannot speak to passions, which instead direct our reason to justify our actions.
"Actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrarity to it...that as reason can never immediatley prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of distinction betwixt moral good and evil."
This seems to be a rather restrictive view of "reason." Surely, reason is more than simply a tool to determine whether something is true or false. Good and evil may be linked to passions like pride and humility but these passions can still be analyzed from a reasonable point of view to determine if they are justified.
"Actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrarity to it...that as reason can never immediatley prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of distinction betwixt moral good and evil."
This seems to be a rather restrictive view of "reason." Surely, reason is more than simply a tool to determine whether something is true or false. Good and evil may be linked to passions like pride and humility but these passions can still be analyzed from a reasonable point of view to determine if they are justified.
Sunday, September 21, 2008
Hume
"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any othe office than to serve and obey them."
When Hume makes this claim he's speaking to the nature of reason and what he calls volition or will. Hume sees reason as a strictly analytical device (he gives the example of mathematics for example). Reason is great at dissecting situations but it is still directionless and is more a means of attaining an end- an end that is set by the passions as Hume sees it- than it is a comprehensive ethical tool. This is nearly directly opposed to virtue ethics which sees reason, or at least knowledge, as a way to cultivate an ethical mindset and carry out correct actions. I think Hume gives far to narrow a definition of reason. Ethics is not performed in a vaccuum in which decisions are guided by the passions. There is usually a few very clear choices in ethical dilemmas (the di prefix here hints at this) and reason can be used to decide the best path to take given the desired outcome. This last part about "desired outcome" is what Hume has a problem with, since the "desired outcome" would have to be dictated by the passions. But virtue ethics uses reason to not only inform you of what you should be desiring but also what is reasonably desirable. It doesn't seem absurd to me to say that passions can set unreasonable desires.
When Hume makes this claim he's speaking to the nature of reason and what he calls volition or will. Hume sees reason as a strictly analytical device (he gives the example of mathematics for example). Reason is great at dissecting situations but it is still directionless and is more a means of attaining an end- an end that is set by the passions as Hume sees it- than it is a comprehensive ethical tool. This is nearly directly opposed to virtue ethics which sees reason, or at least knowledge, as a way to cultivate an ethical mindset and carry out correct actions. I think Hume gives far to narrow a definition of reason. Ethics is not performed in a vaccuum in which decisions are guided by the passions. There is usually a few very clear choices in ethical dilemmas (the di prefix here hints at this) and reason can be used to decide the best path to take given the desired outcome. This last part about "desired outcome" is what Hume has a problem with, since the "desired outcome" would have to be dictated by the passions. But virtue ethics uses reason to not only inform you of what you should be desiring but also what is reasonably desirable. It doesn't seem absurd to me to say that passions can set unreasonable desires.
Thursday, September 18, 2008
I think it's interesting that the snippet about Hume gives us three forces for the explanation of our morals as well as claiming to explain the reason we believe our morals to be objective (insinuating that Hume does not believe this). If there are only three universal forces for explaining human ethical belief how does Hume explain the diversity of ethical beliefs between cultures, or even between individuals? Also if these three forces account for all ethical beliefs can't we also say that they function in a sort of pragmatic objectivity. Sure, these ethical beliefs might not exist "out there", and may therefore not be definitionally "objective", but universally existing "in us" is probably the closest the we can get to objectivity.
I also think that if Hume believes these to be the only forces which give rise to our ethics he might be participating in some pretty hefty reductionism. But, again, these are only snippets and I'll have to wait for the reading to comment further.
I also think that if Hume believes these to be the only forces which give rise to our ethics he might be participating in some pretty hefty reductionism. But, again, these are only snippets and I'll have to wait for the reading to comment further.
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
Admittedly, I couldn't read this classes reading as closely as I would've liked. Doris' arguments I think are interesting, but she seems to argue that there is a mistake in calling someone virtuous in an Aristotelian sense.
Now, most of Aristotle does go over my head and I have problems understanding his entire system and while I find Doris's pyschological argument compelling I think she is wrong to say that systematic ethical systems lead to alienation. Aristotle's virtues, as I understand, do lay out some fairly explicit directives on how to deal with a situation but they almost seem to work the way parables do. By this I mean that while Aristotle might give the example (and he gives A LOT of them) of a display of courage, say in battle, there is a piece in the example that is supposed to lead the reader to phronesis. Phronesis as I understand it is no where near as rigid as Doris characterizes it. I don't think phronesis also necessarilly is simply a single character "setting" but rather acts as a sort of moral compass. It basically says that you know yourself well enough to react to a situation in the right way.
The other problem I have with situationist ethics is the notion that in a given situation our actions are unpredictable. No matter what pyschological empirical data shows I think it's a risky proposition to make. If our actions in certain situations are unpredictable how could we build a political situation to conform with this idea? Should people, since certain situations lead to immoral choices, be ethically regulated in certain instances (obviously this already occurs in things like murder, incest, ect.)? Can people be truly said to be immoral if their actions were the product of circumstance?
Now, most of Aristotle does go over my head and I have problems understanding his entire system and while I find Doris's pyschological argument compelling I think she is wrong to say that systematic ethical systems lead to alienation. Aristotle's virtues, as I understand, do lay out some fairly explicit directives on how to deal with a situation but they almost seem to work the way parables do. By this I mean that while Aristotle might give the example (and he gives A LOT of them) of a display of courage, say in battle, there is a piece in the example that is supposed to lead the reader to phronesis. Phronesis as I understand it is no where near as rigid as Doris characterizes it. I don't think phronesis also necessarilly is simply a single character "setting" but rather acts as a sort of moral compass. It basically says that you know yourself well enough to react to a situation in the right way.
The other problem I have with situationist ethics is the notion that in a given situation our actions are unpredictable. No matter what pyschological empirical data shows I think it's a risky proposition to make. If our actions in certain situations are unpredictable how could we build a political situation to conform with this idea? Should people, since certain situations lead to immoral choices, be ethically regulated in certain instances (obviously this already occurs in things like murder, incest, ect.)? Can people be truly said to be immoral if their actions were the product of circumstance?
Sunday, September 14, 2008
enlightened. confused. enlightened?
I was extremely impressed with Hursthouse’s article regarding virtue ethics. She succinctly attacks my biggest critique of Aristotle’s virtue ethics when she writes that eudemonia is no more vague an ethical guiding subject than happiness or rationality, deontology’s and utilitarianism’s axioms respectively. I am used to an analytical approach to philosophy, which unfortunately neglects areas of philosophy that I recognize to be important- aesthetics and ethics being the two fundamental fields that I feel the most uncomfortable speaking about. Just like Hursthouse’s rhetorical interlocutor I found virtue theory to be based on the nebulous concepts of “good” and “right” action, with little in the way of explaining these concepts. The limits of this outlook (which I did not fully realize was limited to begin with) hit me when Hursthouse wrote that ethical knowledge must be different from analytical knowledge (she uses the example of many young math geniuses but few- if any- young ethical geniuses). Hursthouse’s critiques of deontology and utilitarianism do not discursively prove virtue theory, they merely point out that virtue theory is not unique in its’ defiencies. Never the less they’ve helped me realize that I perhaps had set my criteria for a workable or complete ethical system in a misguided way.
However, Hursthouse begins to confuse me when the actual topic of abortion is brought up. One of the critiques of virtue theory is that because it looks to these virtues for what is right it frequently is unable to speak to the pluralism of ethical systems that exist throughout the globe without perhaps implicitly calling them unethical. Hursthouse uses the example of regions where infanticide and abortion are not seen as unethical but claims that, “it [abortion, infanticide that is perceived as ethical] shows that there is something amiss with the conditions of their lives, which are making it impossible to live well.” (19) It would seem polite to say, as I think Hursthouse might, “there is nothing unethical about you but the culture you live in is repressive and prevents you from living a truly full life” but does this not condemn an entire culture for the sake of sparing personal insult? Does this mean that only cultures that are similar to Hursthouse’s or Artistotle’s in some respect can achieve a society that allows for eudemonia? I am also confused when Hursthouse writes that given the familiar biological facts, motherhood and child bearing are intrinsically worthwhile while concepts like “having a good time” are not (21). If anything “having a good time” seems intrinsically worthwhile while motherhood would be open to debate, although I’m sure this thought would categorize me as immature in Hursthouse’s reckoning. I don’t understand how the familiar biological facts of birth (she cites things like “preganancy takes 9 months before it usually terminates in vaginal birth” as examples of these facts) would make the situation of motherhood itself intrinsically worthwhile and because of this I feel like I am missing out on large parts of her argument.
However, Hursthouse begins to confuse me when the actual topic of abortion is brought up. One of the critiques of virtue theory is that because it looks to these virtues for what is right it frequently is unable to speak to the pluralism of ethical systems that exist throughout the globe without perhaps implicitly calling them unethical. Hursthouse uses the example of regions where infanticide and abortion are not seen as unethical but claims that, “it [abortion, infanticide that is perceived as ethical] shows that there is something amiss with the conditions of their lives, which are making it impossible to live well.” (19) It would seem polite to say, as I think Hursthouse might, “there is nothing unethical about you but the culture you live in is repressive and prevents you from living a truly full life” but does this not condemn an entire culture for the sake of sparing personal insult? Does this mean that only cultures that are similar to Hursthouse’s or Artistotle’s in some respect can achieve a society that allows for eudemonia? I am also confused when Hursthouse writes that given the familiar biological facts, motherhood and child bearing are intrinsically worthwhile while concepts like “having a good time” are not (21). If anything “having a good time” seems intrinsically worthwhile while motherhood would be open to debate, although I’m sure this thought would categorize me as immature in Hursthouse’s reckoning. I don’t understand how the familiar biological facts of birth (she cites things like “preganancy takes 9 months before it usually terminates in vaginal birth” as examples of these facts) would make the situation of motherhood itself intrinsically worthwhile and because of this I feel like I am missing out on large parts of her argument.
Thursday, September 11, 2008
A characteristic becomes a virtue when it avoids a defiency or an excess of a trait. For example someone who is courageous is someone who is unafraid but is not ignorant or overly brash.
I don't think there's any evidence you can draw that would show whether moderation would lead to a fufilling life. The term "fufilling life" is fairly vague and Aristotles' idea of moderation is equally vague. There's no hard and fast guidelines between seeking "the fine" as Aristotle calls it and falling into excess or defiency. Aristotle seems to me to not take ethics as Socrates does, as something that one can gain knowledge of through reason, but rather he looks to clarify how people speak about ethics. He almost always starts with "people say courage (or x) is this" not "courage (or x) is this."
I don't think there's any evidence you can draw that would show whether moderation would lead to a fufilling life. The term "fufilling life" is fairly vague and Aristotles' idea of moderation is equally vague. There's no hard and fast guidelines between seeking "the fine" as Aristotle calls it and falling into excess or defiency. Aristotle seems to me to not take ethics as Socrates does, as something that one can gain knowledge of through reason, but rather he looks to clarify how people speak about ethics. He almost always starts with "people say courage (or x) is this" not "courage (or x) is this."
Sunday, September 7, 2008
What people want
I think all people want happiness. Happiness is the end for which all other endeavors are merely the means. I can't think of a single action worth doing if eventually someone would derive no pleasure from it. Even acts of seeming self-sacrifice bring with them a comfort and pleasure. No rational person would ever choose happiness over unhappiness and because these categories are so broad I think it's fairly safe to say that if all human activity had to be categorized to one end it would be the pursuit of happiness.
The problem becomes seeking this goal. I think the question is deficient because it asks "what is the one principle for which all people strive" and also "what can be done to achieve this principle for the most amount of people." It seems that happiness frequently comes at the cost of another's happiness . The example of a child that made a coat in a sweatshop that is given to a homeless person in winter exemplifies these costs. Is the homeless person at fault for accepting a coat because cruelty was involved in its manufacture? Is the Salvation Army worker at fault for doling the coat out during months when people needed it? Is the CEO of the clothing company at fault if he has broken no laws and uses the added revenue from lowered labor costs to keep his garments competitive and available to poorer people? The attainment of happiness is not guaranteed- only the pursuit is. History seems to be one long project (whether in the fields of economics, culture, politics, or philosophy) in trying to answer the question of how to reconcile this universal want in the most efficient- but never perfect- manner.
PS: I understand the example is far from perfect but it was the first I came up with so please try to focus criticisms on the points of the post. Sorry.
The problem becomes seeking this goal. I think the question is deficient because it asks "what is the one principle for which all people strive" and also "what can be done to achieve this principle for the most amount of people." It seems that happiness frequently comes at the cost of another's happiness . The example of a child that made a coat in a sweatshop that is given to a homeless person in winter exemplifies these costs. Is the homeless person at fault for accepting a coat because cruelty was involved in its manufacture? Is the Salvation Army worker at fault for doling the coat out during months when people needed it? Is the CEO of the clothing company at fault if he has broken no laws and uses the added revenue from lowered labor costs to keep his garments competitive and available to poorer people? The attainment of happiness is not guaranteed- only the pursuit is. History seems to be one long project (whether in the fields of economics, culture, politics, or philosophy) in trying to answer the question of how to reconcile this universal want in the most efficient- but never perfect- manner.
PS: I understand the example is far from perfect but it was the first I came up with so please try to focus criticisms on the points of the post. Sorry.
Well I accidentally deleted the original blog post instead of my last post (I wanted to revise it). Here's my revised last post. I'm sorry to the other class mates that had posted in the thread.
To JMC (cont.)
Yes, I think if Plato is writing a sarcastic Socrates then he needs to be read differently. The question becomes if Socrates doesn't believe in what he's saying what difference does it make (noble lie?)? Belief is a tricky concept and I think Socrates realizes that believing and acting like you believe (or perhaps better put- "half-believing") can still achieve the same results. That's what makes his criticism of Gorgias and rhetoric so ironic.
If you were to ask Socrates how to be ethical he would give you his rational answer. That his answer is lacking in a human quality or seems unassailable yet incomplete tells the reader quite a bit about their own views of ethics. What's great about the socratic dialogues is what they leave out and it's in these spaces that perhaps the most work is done on the reader- or at least for me it is.It's not that I think Socrates is answering in a dishonest manner, just that when he answers he frequently does so with a subtle wink. If a child asked what the right thing to do in a situation was you would give them an honest but different answer than if a peer came to you with the same question. Socrates seems to be giving us a deceptively simple answer in order to provide us with a tool for answering seemingly unanswerable questions- and at least this is a start. I think Socrates sometimes acts sarcastic because he knows he has given you an answer that is unsatifactory- whether it's unsatisfactory because he knew he had to leave out many of the (ineffible?) details or whether it's only unsatisfactory because you've yet to fully understand it fully is constantly up for debate.
My ideas regarding Socrates' ethics and my own, however, are incomplete and rather nebulous and I'm having a bit of trouble putting them into words.
To JMC (cont.)
Yes, I think if Plato is writing a sarcastic Socrates then he needs to be read differently. The question becomes if Socrates doesn't believe in what he's saying what difference does it make (noble lie?)? Belief is a tricky concept and I think Socrates realizes that believing and acting like you believe (or perhaps better put- "half-believing") can still achieve the same results. That's what makes his criticism of Gorgias and rhetoric so ironic.
If you were to ask Socrates how to be ethical he would give you his rational answer. That his answer is lacking in a human quality or seems unassailable yet incomplete tells the reader quite a bit about their own views of ethics. What's great about the socratic dialogues is what they leave out and it's in these spaces that perhaps the most work is done on the reader- or at least for me it is.It's not that I think Socrates is answering in a dishonest manner, just that when he answers he frequently does so with a subtle wink. If a child asked what the right thing to do in a situation was you would give them an honest but different answer than if a peer came to you with the same question. Socrates seems to be giving us a deceptively simple answer in order to provide us with a tool for answering seemingly unanswerable questions- and at least this is a start. I think Socrates sometimes acts sarcastic because he knows he has given you an answer that is unsatifactory- whether it's unsatisfactory because he knew he had to leave out many of the (ineffible?) details or whether it's only unsatisfactory because you've yet to fully understand it fully is constantly up for debate.
My ideas regarding Socrates' ethics and my own, however, are incomplete and rather nebulous and I'm having a bit of trouble putting them into words.
Thursday, September 4, 2008
It's extremely hard to find Plato's opinion in the Gorgias (it's hard enough to find Socrates' opinion since he always seems to be right on the border of sarcasm and irony). I found this quote by Callicles to be a strong condemnation of democracy. What I found interesting about the quote is that where I think Plato would argue that democracy is incongruent with morality, Callicles seems to hint that morality as we know it has actually been created by the weaknesses of democracy:
"In my opinion it's the weaklings who constitute the majority of the human race who make the rules. In making these rules they look after themselves and their own interest, and that's also the criterion they use when they dispense criticism and praise."
(483 c)
The quote is interesting because until this point in the Gorgias I think the debaters have seen morality in a naturalistic or non-historic way. Socrates especially seems to see morality as something created in nature that can be examined by examples and reason instead of something that is created culturally and perhaps is contradictory or suspect- perhaps this is why all the people in Socrates examples seem to be cardboard people that accept punishment or act in a hyper-rational literalist way.
Socrates: "Well, surely, if we look after a community and its citizens, we should try to do so in a way which makes the citizens as good as possible, shouldn't we?" (513e)
This is where Socrates' talk of expertise begins to appear sinister. Earlier Socrates said that Athens had never had a statesman, only politicians that use rhetoric to flatter their constituents. An expert statesman would tell people what was good for them even if they didn't like it. Which of course sounds quite a bit like a dictator.
"In my opinion it's the weaklings who constitute the majority of the human race who make the rules. In making these rules they look after themselves and their own interest, and that's also the criterion they use when they dispense criticism and praise."
(483 c)
The quote is interesting because until this point in the Gorgias I think the debaters have seen morality in a naturalistic or non-historic way. Socrates especially seems to see morality as something created in nature that can be examined by examples and reason instead of something that is created culturally and perhaps is contradictory or suspect- perhaps this is why all the people in Socrates examples seem to be cardboard people that accept punishment or act in a hyper-rational literalist way.
Socrates: "Well, surely, if we look after a community and its citizens, we should try to do so in a way which makes the citizens as good as possible, shouldn't we?" (513e)
This is where Socrates' talk of expertise begins to appear sinister. Earlier Socrates said that Athens had never had a statesman, only politicians that use rhetoric to flatter their constituents. An expert statesman would tell people what was good for them even if they didn't like it. Which of course sounds quite a bit like a dictator.
Tuesday, September 2, 2008
Gorgias
I think the most relevant quote from Gorgias comes at 452e:
Gorgias: "I'm talking about the ability to use the spoken word to persuade- to persuade the jurors in the courts, the members of the council, the citizens attending the assembly- in short, to win over any and every form of public meeting of the citizen body. Armed with this ability, in fact, the doctor would be yours to command, and that businessman would turn out to be making money not for himself...[but] for you."
Gorgias doesn't see a difference between expertise and the appearance of expertise. Socrates points out that there is a difference between what someone believes to be true and what is actually true and that the latter is always preferable. Rhetoric seeks to convince people of expertise without actually having knowledge in the given field. Socrates compares rhetoric to cookery and flattery in that it has the appearance of substance without actually being substantive. Like cookery if a person eats a meal prepared by the chef and a meal prepared by a doctor they will probably prefer the chef's but the doctor's will probably be better for them (read: good, just, ect).
Socrates: "So we'd better think in terms of two kinds of persuasion, one of which confers conviction without understanding, while the other confers knowledge" (454 e)
Polus steps in and claims that doing harm, while not noble, is almost always preferable to having harm done to you and especially so if you go uncaught and guilt-free. He concedes, however, that doing harm is much more contemptable than having harm done to you. Socrates counters that punishment is like a corrective medicine- and like medicine it would be childish to refuse or try to shirk treatment. "So if doing wrong is more contemptible than suffering wrong, then either it's more unpleasant and it's more contemptible because it exceed the alternative in unpleasantness, or it's more contemptible becuase it exceeds the alternative in harmfulness or in both qualities at once. Isn't that bound to be the case?" (475 b). Socrates believes that because doing harm is contemptible it must be bad or that people prefer to be harmed than to harm because it is more pleasant (and maybe both).
Gorgias: "I'm talking about the ability to use the spoken word to persuade- to persuade the jurors in the courts, the members of the council, the citizens attending the assembly- in short, to win over any and every form of public meeting of the citizen body. Armed with this ability, in fact, the doctor would be yours to command, and that businessman would turn out to be making money not for himself...[but] for you."
Gorgias doesn't see a difference between expertise and the appearance of expertise. Socrates points out that there is a difference between what someone believes to be true and what is actually true and that the latter is always preferable. Rhetoric seeks to convince people of expertise without actually having knowledge in the given field. Socrates compares rhetoric to cookery and flattery in that it has the appearance of substance without actually being substantive. Like cookery if a person eats a meal prepared by the chef and a meal prepared by a doctor they will probably prefer the chef's but the doctor's will probably be better for them (read: good, just, ect).
Socrates: "So we'd better think in terms of two kinds of persuasion, one of which confers conviction without understanding, while the other confers knowledge" (454 e)
Polus steps in and claims that doing harm, while not noble, is almost always preferable to having harm done to you and especially so if you go uncaught and guilt-free. He concedes, however, that doing harm is much more contemptable than having harm done to you. Socrates counters that punishment is like a corrective medicine- and like medicine it would be childish to refuse or try to shirk treatment. "So if doing wrong is more contemptible than suffering wrong, then either it's more unpleasant and it's more contemptible because it exceed the alternative in unpleasantness, or it's more contemptible becuase it exceeds the alternative in harmfulness or in both qualities at once. Isn't that bound to be the case?" (475 b). Socrates believes that because doing harm is contemptible it must be bad or that people prefer to be harmed than to harm because it is more pleasant (and maybe both).
Thursday, August 28, 2008
A. In a situation in where one person is being harmed and the other is doing the harming which is the most to be avoided, harming the other or being harmed by another? ect.
My honest answer would be that it is usually "better" to be the harmer then it is to be the one being harmed, but I think the question is a little vague. Different situations call for different values, the situation that is "most to be avoided" changes as goals and contexts change. For example I was a vegetarian for three years but if it came down to me eating a cow or a cow eating me there was really no choice. I don't think in that situation a person would be called unethical, even though I think eating meat is ethically dubious, just rational or perhaps a better word be "sensible."
B. What skills should we work to possess? The skills to persuade people that we are right or the skill to actually be right.
This question assumes that objective truth exists while the last one simply hints at the idea of a universal ethical maxim that exists outside of perception. Both questions are similiar in that they seek to find whether the person answering believes in a reality outside perception in which absolute truth, including absolute ethical truth exists. I think this question sets up the idea that particular beliefs can be shown to be "correct," whereas in the case of things like ethics I don't think our language conforms to reality, or at least perceived reality, enough to make a "correct" statement that could be verifiable.
My first answer to this question was that I'd rather be actually right then be able to persuade people I was right. After reading the question closely, however, I saw that it was only in regards to "beliefs." A belief can't be right or wrong, that's what makes it a belief. This opens up a whole discussion regarding the status of belief statements and the difference between these statements and others that I hope will help me better crystalize the problems and discussions in the field of ethics. Currently I am having a lot of trouble putting the concepts of ethics (or even the idea of ethics) in a way that I can understand.
My honest answer would be that it is usually "better" to be the harmer then it is to be the one being harmed, but I think the question is a little vague. Different situations call for different values, the situation that is "most to be avoided" changes as goals and contexts change. For example I was a vegetarian for three years but if it came down to me eating a cow or a cow eating me there was really no choice. I don't think in that situation a person would be called unethical, even though I think eating meat is ethically dubious, just rational or perhaps a better word be "sensible."
B. What skills should we work to possess? The skills to persuade people that we are right or the skill to actually be right.
This question assumes that objective truth exists while the last one simply hints at the idea of a universal ethical maxim that exists outside of perception. Both questions are similiar in that they seek to find whether the person answering believes in a reality outside perception in which absolute truth, including absolute ethical truth exists. I think this question sets up the idea that particular beliefs can be shown to be "correct," whereas in the case of things like ethics I don't think our language conforms to reality, or at least perceived reality, enough to make a "correct" statement that could be verifiable.
My first answer to this question was that I'd rather be actually right then be able to persuade people I was right. After reading the question closely, however, I saw that it was only in regards to "beliefs." A belief can't be right or wrong, that's what makes it a belief. This opens up a whole discussion regarding the status of belief statements and the difference between these statements and others that I hope will help me better crystalize the problems and discussions in the field of ethics. Currently I am having a lot of trouble putting the concepts of ethics (or even the idea of ethics) in a way that I can understand.
It's a little embarrassing (maybe even a little more than embarrassing) to admit that this is my last class before the completion of my philosophy minor and when it comes to ethics my mind just goes blank. This occurs in religion as well but ethics especially just shorts out my brain. However, I still feel like if a situation arose I'd be able to say what a moral outcome would be- as long as the situation was simple enough- but I wouldn't be able to tell you what that decision was anchored to and what made it moral. I don't think there is anything static enough or universal enough to warrant blanket moral justification- at least I don't see it. I'm extremely interested in how philosophers have approached and are now approaching an idea like "ethics" that to me sounds so broad, nebulous, and packed with such a long history spanning so many cultures that the term almost loses all meaning.
That's not to say I don't think ethics aren't important. Ethics guides our lives- and our lives guide our ethics. But just because something is socially or personally important does not mean it has a philosophical justification (except that perhaps it is socially or personally important). Of course not having a philosophical justification is not necessarily a bad thing- I would point to art and religion as two great things that in my opinion don't have or don't need justification and there are many more. In the end I see ethics as a constantly negotiated (both inter and intra-personally negotiated) field in which no maxim will ever be complete, universal, or capital T True. However, I also don't think this is the tragedy that many of the 19th century philosophers that we are reading made it out to be.
That's not to say I don't think ethics aren't important. Ethics guides our lives- and our lives guide our ethics. But just because something is socially or personally important does not mean it has a philosophical justification (except that perhaps it is socially or personally important). Of course not having a philosophical justification is not necessarily a bad thing- I would point to art and religion as two great things that in my opinion don't have or don't need justification and there are many more. In the end I see ethics as a constantly negotiated (both inter and intra-personally negotiated) field in which no maxim will ever be complete, universal, or capital T True. However, I also don't think this is the tragedy that many of the 19th century philosophers that we are reading made it out to be.
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