Natural Virtues and Vices

Hume identifies a distinction between natural and artifical virtues and vices but the two are more closely tied than their titles would suggest. Artificial virtues are virtues that are "made" by society in order to benefit it. An artificial virtue may be something like "political justice" or "politeness" which are agreed upon by everyone to be beneficial but which must appeal to a natural virtue in order to be legitimate. A natural virtue is something like sympathy which does not have to be reasoned (at least according to Hume) and is simply felt. For example a politician may make an overture for the artificial virtue of political justice but it is our natural virtue of sympathy that lends this plea weight.
Here sympathy does not seem to mean the same thing as compassion, which is a sort of limitless forgiveness for circumstance, but rather acts as a sort of universal law based on humanities similiar dispositions. Because we all have relatively universal feelings (pain, pleasure, ect) we can identify in someone qualities that we esteem (or despise) in ourselves or qualities that we wish we had (or are glad that we don't). Sympathy then, "is the source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues." (369). Hume draws finer and finer distinctions throughout the chapter (ex: we are more likely to sympathsize with someone who is relatively closer or better known to us) but the same general principle runs throughout. The question I would pose here is how this accounts for people like sociopaths who perhaps take advantage of people's sympathy without feeling any of their own.
Also, I don't even know where to begin on this quote but it seems from the paragraph following it that it deals with proximity in regards to the level of sympathy felt (ex: more sympathetic to shipwrecked sailors if I can see them then if I simply read about them).
"In all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive from another, to which it is compared, a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in its direct and immediate survey. The direct survey of another's pleasure naturally gives us pleasure, and therefore produces pain when compared with our own. His pain considered in itself, is painful to us, but augments the idea of our own happiness, and gives us pleasure." (emphasis mine).
Hume seems to be saying that through the natural virtue of sympathy we will feel happy when someone around us is happy but this pleasure raises our expectations and will produce more pain in us (and vice versa for someone expiriencing pain in proximity to us- we will eventually derive pleasure). This seems to say that someone emoting near us will produce both pleasure and pain. If this is the case how can we say something is moral in Hume's system? Something is moral, according to Hume, if it illicits a feeling of pleasure in us, but if nearly all things will illicit both pleasure and pain then is anything properly moral in a Humean sense?

I'm still a bit confused of what to make of Hume's claim that reason can say nothing regarding ethics. He writes that because reason is only concerned with whether something is true or false it cannot speak to passions, which instead direct our reason to justify our actions.
"Actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrarity to it...that as reason can never immediatley prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of distinction betwixt moral good and evil."
This seems to be a rather restrictive view of "reason." Surely, reason is more than simply a tool to determine whether something is true or false. Good and evil may be linked to passions like pride and humility but these passions can still be analyzed from a reasonable point of view to determine if they are justified.

Hume

"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any othe office than to serve and obey them."

When Hume makes this claim he's speaking to the nature of reason and what he calls volition or will. Hume sees reason as a strictly analytical device (he gives the example of mathematics for example). Reason is great at dissecting situations but it is still directionless and is more a means of attaining an end- an end that is set by the passions as Hume sees it- than it is a comprehensive ethical tool. This is nearly directly opposed to virtue ethics which sees reason, or at least knowledge, as a way to cultivate an ethical mindset and carry out correct actions. I think Hume gives far to narrow a definition of reason. Ethics is not performed in a vaccuum in which decisions are guided by the passions. There is usually a few very clear choices in ethical dilemmas (the di prefix here hints at this) and reason can be used to decide the best path to take given the desired outcome. This last part about "desired outcome" is what Hume has a problem with, since the "desired outcome" would have to be dictated by the passions. But virtue ethics uses reason to not only inform you of what you should be desiring but also what is reasonably desirable. It doesn't seem absurd to me to say that passions can set unreasonable desires.

I think it's interesting that the snippet about Hume gives us three forces for the explanation of our morals as well as claiming to explain the reason we believe our morals to be objective (insinuating that Hume does not believe this). If there are only three universal forces for explaining human ethical belief how does Hume explain the diversity of ethical beliefs between cultures, or even between individuals? Also if these three forces account for all ethical beliefs can't we also say that they function in a sort of pragmatic objectivity. Sure, these ethical beliefs might not exist "out there", and may therefore not be definitionally "objective", but universally existing "in us" is probably the closest the we can get to objectivity.
I also think that if Hume believes these to be the only forces which give rise to our ethics he might be participating in some pretty hefty reductionism. But, again, these are only snippets and I'll have to wait for the reading to comment further.

Admittedly, I couldn't read this classes reading as closely as I would've liked. Doris' arguments I think are interesting, but she seems to argue that there is a mistake in calling someone virtuous in an Aristotelian sense.
Now, most of Aristotle does go over my head and I have problems understanding his entire system and while I find Doris's pyschological argument compelling I think she is wrong to say that systematic ethical systems lead to alienation. Aristotle's virtues, as I understand, do lay out some fairly explicit directives on how to deal with a situation but they almost seem to work the way parables do. By this I mean that while Aristotle might give the example (and he gives A LOT of them) of a display of courage, say in battle, there is a piece in the example that is supposed to lead the reader to phronesis. Phronesis as I understand it is no where near as rigid as Doris characterizes it. I don't think phronesis also necessarilly is simply a single character "setting" but rather acts as a sort of moral compass. It basically says that you know yourself well enough to react to a situation in the right way.
The other problem I have with situationist ethics is the notion that in a given situation our actions are unpredictable. No matter what pyschological empirical data shows I think it's a risky proposition to make. If our actions in certain situations are unpredictable how could we build a political situation to conform with this idea? Should people, since certain situations lead to immoral choices, be ethically regulated in certain instances (obviously this already occurs in things like murder, incest, ect.)? Can people be truly said to be immoral if their actions were the product of circumstance?

enlightened. confused. enlightened?

I was extremely impressed with Hursthouse’s article regarding virtue ethics. She succinctly attacks my biggest critique of Aristotle’s virtue ethics when she writes that eudemonia is no more vague an ethical guiding subject than happiness or rationality, deontology’s and utilitarianism’s axioms respectively. I am used to an analytical approach to philosophy, which unfortunately neglects areas of philosophy that I recognize to be important- aesthetics and ethics being the two fundamental fields that I feel the most uncomfortable speaking about. Just like Hursthouse’s rhetorical interlocutor I found virtue theory to be based on the nebulous concepts of “good” and “right” action, with little in the way of explaining these concepts. The limits of this outlook (which I did not fully realize was limited to begin with) hit me when Hursthouse wrote that ethical knowledge must be different from analytical knowledge (she uses the example of many young math geniuses but few- if any- young ethical geniuses). Hursthouse’s critiques of deontology and utilitarianism do not discursively prove virtue theory, they merely point out that virtue theory is not unique in its’ defiencies. Never the less they’ve helped me realize that I perhaps had set my criteria for a workable or complete ethical system in a misguided way.
However, Hursthouse begins to confuse me when the actual topic of abortion is brought up. One of the critiques of virtue theory is that because it looks to these virtues for what is right it frequently is unable to speak to the pluralism of ethical systems that exist throughout the globe without perhaps implicitly calling them unethical. Hursthouse uses the example of regions where infanticide and abortion are not seen as unethical but claims that, “it [abortion, infanticide that is perceived as ethical] shows that there is something amiss with the conditions of their lives, which are making it impossible to live well.” (19) It would seem polite to say, as I think Hursthouse might, “there is nothing unethical about you but the culture you live in is repressive and prevents you from living a truly full life” but does this not condemn an entire culture for the sake of sparing personal insult? Does this mean that only cultures that are similar to Hursthouse’s or Artistotle’s in some respect can achieve a society that allows for eudemonia? I am also confused when Hursthouse writes that given the familiar biological facts, motherhood and child bearing are intrinsically worthwhile while concepts like “having a good time” are not (21). If anything “having a good time” seems intrinsically worthwhile while motherhood would be open to debate, although I’m sure this thought would categorize me as immature in Hursthouse’s reckoning. I don’t understand how the familiar biological facts of birth (she cites things like “preganancy takes 9 months before it usually terminates in vaginal birth” as examples of these facts) would make the situation of motherhood itself intrinsically worthwhile and because of this I feel like I am missing out on large parts of her argument.

A characteristic becomes a virtue when it avoids a defiency or an excess of a trait. For example someone who is courageous is someone who is unafraid but is not ignorant or overly brash.

I don't think there's any evidence you can draw that would show whether moderation would lead to a fufilling life. The term "fufilling life" is fairly vague and Aristotles' idea of moderation is equally vague. There's no hard and fast guidelines between seeking "the fine" as Aristotle calls it and falling into excess or defiency. Aristotle seems to me to not take ethics as Socrates does, as something that one can gain knowledge of through reason, but rather he looks to clarify how people speak about ethics. He almost always starts with "people say courage (or x) is this" not "courage (or x) is this."

What people want

I think all people want happiness. Happiness is the end for which all other endeavors are merely the means. I can't think of a single action worth doing if eventually someone would derive no pleasure from it. Even acts of seeming self-sacrifice bring with them a comfort and pleasure. No rational person would ever choose happiness over unhappiness and because these categories are so broad I think it's fairly safe to say that if all human activity had to be categorized to one end it would be the pursuit of happiness.

The problem becomes seeking this goal. I think the question is deficient because it asks "what is the one principle for which all people strive" and also "what can be done to achieve this principle for the most amount of people." It seems that happiness frequently comes at the cost of another's happiness . The example of a child that made a coat in a sweatshop that is given to a homeless person in winter exemplifies these costs. Is the homeless person at fault for accepting a coat because cruelty was involved in its manufacture? Is the Salvation Army worker at fault for doling the coat out during months when people needed it? Is the CEO of the clothing company at fault if he has broken no laws and uses the added revenue from lowered labor costs to keep his garments competitive and available to poorer people? The attainment of happiness is not guaranteed- only the pursuit is. History seems to be one long project (whether in the fields of economics, culture, politics, or philosophy) in trying to answer the question of how to reconcile this universal want in the most efficient- but never perfect- manner.

PS: I understand the example is far from perfect but it was the first I came up with so please try to focus criticisms on the points of the post. Sorry.

Well I accidentally deleted the original blog post instead of my last post (I wanted to revise it). Here's my revised last post. I'm sorry to the other class mates that had posted in the thread.

To JMC (cont.)
Yes, I think if Plato is writing a sarcastic Socrates then he needs to be read differently. The question becomes if Socrates doesn't believe in what he's saying what difference does it make (noble lie?)? Belief is a tricky concept and I think Socrates realizes that believing and acting like you believe (or perhaps better put- "half-believing") can still achieve the same results. That's what makes his criticism of Gorgias and rhetoric so ironic.
If you were to ask Socrates how to be ethical he would give you his rational answer. That his answer is lacking in a human quality or seems unassailable yet incomplete tells the reader quite a bit about their own views of ethics. What's great about the socratic dialogues is what they leave out and it's in these spaces that perhaps the most work is done on the reader- or at least for me it is.It's not that I think Socrates is answering in a dishonest manner, just that when he answers he frequently does so with a subtle wink. If a child asked what the right thing to do in a situation was you would give them an honest but different answer than if a peer came to you with the same question. Socrates seems to be giving us a deceptively simple answer in order to provide us with a tool for answering seemingly unanswerable questions- and at least this is a start. I think Socrates sometimes acts sarcastic because he knows he has given you an answer that is unsatifactory- whether it's unsatisfactory because he knew he had to leave out many of the (ineffible?) details or whether it's only unsatisfactory because you've yet to fully understand it fully is constantly up for debate.
My ideas regarding Socrates' ethics and my own, however, are incomplete and rather nebulous and I'm having a bit of trouble putting them into words.

It's extremely hard to find Plato's opinion in the Gorgias (it's hard enough to find Socrates' opinion since he always seems to be right on the border of sarcasm and irony). I found this quote by Callicles to be a strong condemnation of democracy. What I found interesting about the quote is that where I think Plato would argue that democracy is incongruent with morality, Callicles seems to hint that morality as we know it has actually been created by the weaknesses of democracy:

"In my opinion it's the weaklings who constitute the majority of the human race who make the rules. In making these rules they look after themselves and their own interest, and that's also the criterion they use when they dispense criticism and praise."
(483 c)
The quote is interesting because until this point in the Gorgias I think the debaters have seen morality in a naturalistic or non-historic way. Socrates especially seems to see morality as something created in nature that can be examined by examples and reason instead of something that is created culturally and perhaps is contradictory or suspect- perhaps this is why all the people in Socrates examples seem to be cardboard people that accept punishment or act in a hyper-rational literalist way.

Socrates: "Well, surely, if we look after a community and its citizens, we should try to do so in a way which makes the citizens as good as possible, shouldn't we?" (513e)

This is where Socrates' talk of expertise begins to appear sinister. Earlier Socrates said that Athens had never had a statesman, only politicians that use rhetoric to flatter their constituents. An expert statesman would tell people what was good for them even if they didn't like it. Which of course sounds quite a bit like a dictator.

Gorgias

I think the most relevant quote from Gorgias comes at 452e:
Gorgias: "I'm talking about the ability to use the spoken word to persuade- to persuade the jurors in the courts, the members of the council, the citizens attending the assembly- in short, to win over any and every form of public meeting of the citizen body. Armed with this ability, in fact, the doctor would be yours to command, and that businessman would turn out to be making money not for himself...[but] for you."

Gorgias doesn't see a difference between expertise and the appearance of expertise. Socrates points out that there is a difference between what someone believes to be true and what is actually true and that the latter is always preferable. Rhetoric seeks to convince people of expertise without actually having knowledge in the given field. Socrates compares rhetoric to cookery and flattery in that it has the appearance of substance without actually being substantive. Like cookery if a person eats a meal prepared by the chef and a meal prepared by a doctor they will probably prefer the chef's but the doctor's will probably be better for them (read: good, just, ect).

Socrates: "So we'd better think in terms of two kinds of persuasion, one of which confers conviction without understanding, while the other confers knowledge" (454 e)

Polus steps in and claims that doing harm, while not noble, is almost always preferable to having harm done to you and especially so if you go uncaught and guilt-free. He concedes, however, that doing harm is much more contemptable than having harm done to you. Socrates counters that punishment is like a corrective medicine- and like medicine it would be childish to refuse or try to shirk treatment. "So if doing wrong is more contemptible than suffering wrong, then either it's more unpleasant and it's more contemptible because it exceed the alternative in unpleasantness, or it's more contemptible becuase it exceeds the alternative in harmfulness or in both qualities at once. Isn't that bound to be the case?" (475 b). Socrates believes that because doing harm is contemptible it must be bad or that people prefer to be harmed than to harm because it is more pleasant (and maybe both).