Utilitarianism

Mill begins by saying that if we are looking for something like a scientific proof for any ethical system we misuse the term "proof", or at least deploy it in an improper setting when we try to apply it to ethics. I found this fascinating because I think I frequently am lost in ethics because it's mode of proving itself is foreign to me and I did not study the theories on their own terms. Because ethics seeks what is good, "whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof," (184). Ethics, then, is an intellectual pursuit, and not an ends, and, "the formula may be accepted or rejected, but it is not a subject of what is commonly understood by proof."(184)

In part II, Mill defends utilitarianism from the historic critiques of similar systems like Epicureanism, and in so doing helps to positively shape what he conceives as the "rule of Happiness". Utilitarianism, he says, is not the Bacchanalian pursuit of pleasure that it is sometimes characterized as, nor is it the cold spreadsheet analysis of pure utility. Instead, utilitarianism seeks happiness by satisfying the noblest human wants for the most amount of people. We might momentarily stray into immediate or beastly pleasure but it is our sense of dignity, the thing that separates us from beasts and ignorant people, that must eventually be satisfied to achieve pleasure. The biggest question I have for Mill is one he brings up himself when he writes, "What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain[?]"(189). He says to answer this we must rely on the testimony of the experienced, but aren't there many choices that we make that don't manifest their full costs, or their full pleasures for that matter, until long after we have made them? When is someone experienced enough to be counted as reliable testimony for the costs and benefits of a decision? We can surely limit the scope of what will be affected by our moral decisions, Mill says on 196 that 999 out of 1000 of our decisions are ones that regard private utility and don't require considering the broad public interests of the decision, but I still think it is a problem that we can't more fully measure the pains and pleasures that will be unleashed by our decision. After all, if the backbone of utilitarianism is picking the option that maximizes pleasure and diminishes it's opposite we first must be able to get the facts of each option.

If we are take non-contradiction seriously than any moral statement should work like the "golden rule." If I say, "criminals should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law" it would be hypocritical of me to ask for a reduced sentence. I would in effect be saying, "this should be applied to everyone else but not me" and that is a contradiction. For certain things it would unreasonable for nearly everyone to be contradictory and therefore we could perhaps find a universal moral code for some things. For example, we might say, "is it ever right to kill yourself?" The person contemplating suicide would have to ask themselves whether it would be right for everyone in the world to kill themselves, if it wouldn't then they would contradicting themselves by saying, "it would be morally acceptable for me to kill myself."

Hume

Hume begins section 1 with a reiteration to what we read earlier in class. He says that ethics must apply to the sentiments and not to reason alone. However, he also says that reason can guide us and inform us regarding the facts a situation, and that these should be considered when making moral choices. It is not enough simply to say that because a certain is perceived as odious to you it is viceful (or vice versa regarding virtue), this opinion must be informed by expirience. What I found interesting is that in one sentence he says, "It is probable..that this final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, hich nature has made universal in the whole species" (75). This speaks to the distinction we made earlier in class over a Hume conception of "objective" versus a Greek or traditional view of "objective", the former relating to universality and the latter refering to some "out there" principle which can be discovered outside of us as opposed to observed within human nature.
The overriding theme for the rest of the reading is the idea of utility. Utility, for Hume, both helps define our idea of things like justice as well as sets the context for such a term to be meaningful. For Hume their is no overriding principle which guides ethical action in all situations, but rather morality depends largely on social circumstance. He gives the example of a shipwreck victim procurring as much goods as he can for survival at the expense of other victims. This would not be unethical for Hume since justice depends on at least the ability of social sustainability. He talks of how in a society free of want justice loses its meaning but in a society in which the basic needs for all absent justice loses its utility and must be disregarded.
At first I read this conception justice in a positive light. I think it would healthy policy (both in foreign and domestic policy) to assure that basic needs for all people are met- if not to be morally good than to at least ensure that justice, which surely serves people, functions in a healthy way. However, he says that as the relationship of the state enters into the question of morality it is sometimes necessary to suspend the rule of law when justice is no longer a utility to the public. He writes, "Men are necessarilly born in a famil-society, at least; and are trained up by their parents to some ruleofconduct and behavior. But this mustbeadmitted, tha, ifsuchastateofmutual war andviolence was ever real,thesuspension ofalllaws andjustice, from their absolute inutility, is a necessary and infallibalble consequence." The first thing I thought of when I read this was the USPATRIOT act. I had never thought about it but if justice is seen strictly in view of how beneficial it is to society does that mean that there are times when it can be suspended? Shouldn't it be argued that justice is always beneficial to society, even in times of total war, and has intrinsic value, or at least there would never be a situation in which the suspension of justice was more beneficial than its upkeep?