enlightened. confused. enlightened?

I was extremely impressed with Hursthouse’s article regarding virtue ethics. She succinctly attacks my biggest critique of Aristotle’s virtue ethics when she writes that eudemonia is no more vague an ethical guiding subject than happiness or rationality, deontology’s and utilitarianism’s axioms respectively. I am used to an analytical approach to philosophy, which unfortunately neglects areas of philosophy that I recognize to be important- aesthetics and ethics being the two fundamental fields that I feel the most uncomfortable speaking about. Just like Hursthouse’s rhetorical interlocutor I found virtue theory to be based on the nebulous concepts of “good” and “right” action, with little in the way of explaining these concepts. The limits of this outlook (which I did not fully realize was limited to begin with) hit me when Hursthouse wrote that ethical knowledge must be different from analytical knowledge (she uses the example of many young math geniuses but few- if any- young ethical geniuses). Hursthouse’s critiques of deontology and utilitarianism do not discursively prove virtue theory, they merely point out that virtue theory is not unique in its’ defiencies. Never the less they’ve helped me realize that I perhaps had set my criteria for a workable or complete ethical system in a misguided way.
However, Hursthouse begins to confuse me when the actual topic of abortion is brought up. One of the critiques of virtue theory is that because it looks to these virtues for what is right it frequently is unable to speak to the pluralism of ethical systems that exist throughout the globe without perhaps implicitly calling them unethical. Hursthouse uses the example of regions where infanticide and abortion are not seen as unethical but claims that, “it [abortion, infanticide that is perceived as ethical] shows that there is something amiss with the conditions of their lives, which are making it impossible to live well.” (19) It would seem polite to say, as I think Hursthouse might, “there is nothing unethical about you but the culture you live in is repressive and prevents you from living a truly full life” but does this not condemn an entire culture for the sake of sparing personal insult? Does this mean that only cultures that are similar to Hursthouse’s or Artistotle’s in some respect can achieve a society that allows for eudemonia? I am also confused when Hursthouse writes that given the familiar biological facts, motherhood and child bearing are intrinsically worthwhile while concepts like “having a good time” are not (21). If anything “having a good time” seems intrinsically worthwhile while motherhood would be open to debate, although I’m sure this thought would categorize me as immature in Hursthouse’s reckoning. I don’t understand how the familiar biological facts of birth (she cites things like “preganancy takes 9 months before it usually terminates in vaginal birth” as examples of these facts) would make the situation of motherhood itself intrinsically worthwhile and because of this I feel like I am missing out on large parts of her argument.